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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a golf course development project undertaken by Pend Oreille Bonner 
Development, Inc. ("POBD") in Sandpoint, Idaho known as The Idaho Club. MDG Nevada, Inc. 
("MDG") entered into a purchase agreement on January 6, 2005 with North Idaho Resorts, LLC 
("NIR") to purchase an existing golf course, an existing clubhouse and multiple parcels of property 
fordevelopment. 1 Trial Exhibit 3, Trial Exhibit AAA. TrVol2,p.137,Ll.11-24. 
A Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement was entered 
into on March 9, 2006, between NIR and Pend Oreille Bonner Investments, LLC, ("PBI"), a related 
assignee of MDG. Id. The parcels sold by NIR were generally identified by the seller and 
purchaser based upon their proximity to certain physical features of the real property. Some of the 
parcels were collectively identified as the Trestle Creek property. Tr Vol. 2, p. 115, LL 13-24. 
PBI later assigned its interest over to a related entity, Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC 
("POBD"). Tr Vol. 2, p. 116, LL 7-14; Tr Vol. 2, p. 284, L. 21 -p. 285, L. 13; Tr Vol. 2, p. 114, 
LL 10-20; Tr Vol. 2 p. 132, LL 5-12. 
On October 29, 2007, Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. ("Pacific Capital") authorized an 
extension of credit to POBD. Trial Exhibit III. The credit authorization consisted of Facility #1 
and Facility #2. Id. Facility #1 was structured as an operating line of credit in the amount of five 
million dollars secured by Chip Bowlby's and Thomas Merschel's personal guaranties and money 
market accounts held by Chip Bowlby and Thomas Merschel (worth five million dollars together.) 
Id. The line of credit facility had a 90 day term. Id. Upon the expiration of the term, Facility #2 
1 The trial court found that POBD intended to build the clubhouse after its purchase. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1718. This 
finding was incorrect. The clubhouse was part of the sale. See Trial Exhibits 3, AAA. 
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of the credit authorization provided for a new loan of five million dollars secured by the Trestle 
Creek property in the amount of five million dollars. Id. No new money was advanced by Pacific 
Capital to POBD upon conversion to Facility #2. Trial Exhibit III, Tr Vol. 2, p. 172, LL 5-11; p. 
173, LL 5-11, p. 216, LI. 6-15. 
POBD defaulted on the Facility #2 loan. R Vol. I, pp. 71-72. Pacific Capital brought a 
foreclosure action against several defendants seeking to collect on its promissory note and 
foreclose its mortgage as a first priority lien holder. R Vol. I, pp. 65-104. This case arises from 
the district court's ruling that: 1) NIR had no vendor's lien, 2) or if it held such a lien, it was paid, 
and 3) that Pacific Capital was a bona fide lender. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Given the number of parties, there were several pleadings and motions which are not 
relevant to this appeal. These course of proceedings address those proceedings which relate to the 
present appeal. 
On January 8, 2011, Pacific Capital filed its Complaint for Mortgage Foreclosure. R Vol. 
I, pp. 65-104. The complaint was verified by a subsequent affidavit. R Vol. I, pp. 110-111. On 
May 17, 2011, a First Amended Complaint seeking reformation of the legal description attached 
to the mortgage and foreclosure of the mortgage as reformed. R Vol. I, pp. 122-163. 
NIR filed a notice of appearance on February 23, 2011. R Vol. I, pp. 114-116. On June 
15, 2012, NIR filed its answer, counterclaim and cross claim. R Vol. II, pp. 397-540. On July 6, 
2012, Pacific Capital replied to NIR's counter claim. R Vol. III, pp. 607-619. R.E. Loans 
answered the cross claim on April 29, 2013. R Vol. IV, pp. 857-926. On August 20, 2013, R.E. 
Loans stipulated with NIR regarding NIR's claims against it. R Vol. VI, pp. 1328-1333. R.E. 
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Loans filed a disclaimer of interest in Trestle Creek on August 20, 2013. R Vol. VI, pp. 1340-
1344. 
On August 29, 2011, JV, LLC (JV) filed its Answer to First Amended Complaint, 
Counterclaim and Cross Claim. Vol. I, R pp. 184-194. On July 9, 2012, Pacific Capital replied to 
JV's counter claim. R Vol. III, p. 623-630. 
Several parties defaulted or were dismissed from the suit. Other parties stipulated to 
priority with Pacific Capital. R Vol. III, pp. 631-635; R Vol. III, pp. 639-646; R Vol. IV, pp. 936-
939. Other parties disclaimed any interest. R Vol. III, pp. 636-638. 
Defendant R.E. Loans, LLC filed bankruptcy during the case and the district court entered 
a stay order related to it on September 28, 2011. R Vol. II, pp. 327-334. On May 2, 2012, the 
Court was notified that an order for relief from the automatic stay was filed in the R.E. Loans 
bankruptcy on March 12, 2012. R Vol. II, pp. 348-354. A hearing was held on the request to lift 
the stay regarding R.E. Loans. R Vol. II, p. 392. Following the hearing, on June 7, 2012, the trial 
court lifted the stay as to R.E. Loans. Id. 
Defendant Mortgage Fund '08 also filed bankruptcy during the case and the district court 
entered a stay order relating to it on September 28, 2011. R Vol. II, pp. 321-326. On May 2, 2012, 
the trial court was notified that an order granting relief from the automatic stay was filed in the 
Mortgage Fund '08 bankruptcy. R Vol. II, pp. 355-561. A stay was entered September 28, 2011. 
R Vol. II, pp. 321-326. 
On July 9, 2012, Pacific Capital filed a notice of name change alerting the district court 
and parties that its name was changed to Santa Barbara Bank & Trust, N.A. Vol. III, pp. 620-622. 
On August 29, 2012, Pacific Capital moved to amend the caption of the matter to reflect the name 
change. R Vol. III, pp. 653-565. On October 17, 2012, the district court entered its order granting 
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the motion to amend the caption. R Vol. III, pp. 676-678. On January 14, 2013, Plaintiff moved 
to amend the caption to Union Bank, N.A. ("Union Bank") due to a name change resulting from a 
merger. R Vol. III, pp. 682-685. An order granting the second motion to amend the caption was 
entered February 4, 2013. R Vol. III, pp. 702-704. On December 3, 2014, another order granting 
a name change was entered changing the name of the plaintiff to MUFG Union Bank, N .A. R Vol. 
VIII, pp. 1821-1823. 
On July 1, 2013, Union Bank filed for summary judgment against NIR and JV. R Vol. IV, 
pp. 941-944; Vol. V, pp. 1026-1099. On August 28, 2013, the trial court entered its memorandum 
decision on the partial summary judgment motion against NIR holding: 1) the mortgage should be 
reformed due to a scrivener's error in a directional call in the metes and bound description, and 2) 
denying the motion for a declaration of priority in favor of Union Bank because Pacific Capital 
knew NIR sold the property and had not been paid, and a question of fact existed regarding a partial 
termination of interest that was recorded with two separate legal descriptions. R Vol. VI, pp. 134 7-
1351. A summary judgment order was subsequently entered consistent with the memorandum. R 
Vol. VI, pp. 1352-1353. 
The matter proceeded to a court trial on May 12 and May 13, 2014. R Vol. VIII, pp. 1668-
1716. The trial issues between the remaining parties were bifurcated. Id. The first phase of the 
trial dealt with the lien priority between Pacific Capital's reformed mortgage and North Idaho 
Resorts' vendor's lien, while the second phase dealt with the lien priority between North Idaho 
Resorts vendor's lien and JV, LLC's subordinated mortgage. Id. 
On June 3, 2014, the trial court entered findings and ruled for Union Bank on its lien 
priority. R Vol. VIII, pp. 1718-1723. The trial court also held that JV, LLC's mortgage was 
superior to NIR's vendor's lien despite the subordination agreement. Id. On July 14, 2014, the 
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trial court entered its Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure as to All Defendants. R Vol. III, pp. 
1724-1731. This judgment did not comply with Rule 54(a). On September 19, 2014, a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure as to NIR was entered. R Vol. VIII, pp. 1782-1786. On December 4, 
2014, another final judgment with a Rule 54(b) certificate was filed. R Vol. VIII, pp. 1824-1826. 
This appeal was filed August 6, 2014, by NIR. R Vol. VIII, p. 1744-1479. This Court 
entered an order consolidating this appeal with JV, LLC's appeal for purposes of the preparation 
of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript only. R Vol. VII, pp. 1829-1831. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 6, 2005, NIR entered into a purchase and sale agreement to sell multiple parcels 
ofreal property near Sandpoint Idaho to MDG. Trial Exhibit 3, Trial Exhibit AAA. On March 9, 
2006, NIR entered into a Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with PBI regarding the same sale. Id The purchase and sale agreement indicated the 
sale included an existing golf course and an existing clubhouse collectively known as Hidden 
Lakes Golf Course, a portion of land located north of Highway 200, all the property south of 
Highway 200 commonly called "Moose Mountain" and two lakefront parcels (which are the 
subject of this lawsuit and known as the Trestle Creek property). Id at section A. The agreement 
at clause 1 provided that the Seller (NIR) would sell the property to the Buyer (PBI) and the Buyer 
(PBI) would purchase the property. Id at clause 1. 
The purchase and sale agreement contained a Seller's Authority clause in section 11. 
Subsection 1 l(a) represented that the "Seller is a limited liability company duly formed and in 
good standing under the laws of the State ofldaho. Seller or Seller's partners own marketable fee 
simple title to the entirety of the Property. Seller has the legal power, right and authority to enter 
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into this Agreement and the instruments referenced herein, and to consummate the transactions 
contemplated in this Agreement." Id at clause 11. 
The purchase and sale agreement addressed the purchase price to be paid for the property. 
It required a down payment of 4.75 million dollars paid at closing. Trial Exhibit 3; Trial Exhibit 
AAA at clause 2(a). It included acceptance of title to the property subject to two deeds of trust 
securing payment of two promissory notes, one with Mr. Berry (JV, LLC) and one with R.E. 
Loans, and assumption of payment responsibility for the two notes. Id It required POBI to execute 
a promissory note to NIR in the amount of any principal reduction paid by NIR to R.E. Loans 
between execution of the purchase and sale agreement and closing of the transaction. Id. Besides 
the down payment, the purchase and sale agreement included additional amounts owed after lot 
sales reached defined levels with the amount owed from PBI to NIR based upon a formula. Id. 
The purchase price also addressed bulk sales and included payments owed to NIR if such bulk 
sales occurred. Id at 2( d). 
At trial, Charles Reeves testified. Reeves is one of the partners of POBD. Tr p. 114, LL 
9-11. Reeves was president in charge of day-to-day operations of the development. Tr Vol 2, p. 
115, LL 4-11. 
Richard Villelli also testified at trial. Villelli is the President of Villelli Enterprises, Inc., 
which is the managing member of NIR. Trial Exhibit 3; Trial Exhibit AAA. Villelli is also the 
president of VP, Inc. Tr Vol. 3, p. 415, LL 3-14. 
At the closing of the transaction, POBD executed a $511,000 promissory note to NIR for 
payment of the principal reduction on the R.E. Loans note paid by NIR between execution of the 
purchase and sale agreement and closing. Tr Vol. 2, p. 294, LL 6-24; Trial Exhibit WWW. Reeves 
testified the $511,000 promissory note was paid in early 2008. Tr Vol. 2, p. 136, LL 9-15; p. 186, 
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LL 9-16. Villelli testified the $511,000 promissory note was paid April 8, 2008. Tr Vol. 2, p. 294, 
L. 25 - p. 295, L. 3. 
The purchase price anticipated payment as sales occurred. Reeves testified that the 
participation payment formula was a term of the purchase price, but umelated to POBD's profit. 
Tr Vol 2, p. 120, LL 10-15; p. 184, L. 21 - p. 185, L. 5. Reeves testified potential bulk sales of 
lots were also covered as part of the purchase price. Tr Vol. 2, p. 18, LL 6-14. Villelli' s testimony 
was consistent with Reeves' testimony regarding the terms of the purchase price. Tr Vol. 2, p, 
287, L. 17 - p. 289, L. 22. The final purchase price was derived from a formula in the purchase 
and sale agreement. Tr Vol. I, p. 186, LL 3-8. The purchase and sale lot sale participation term 
was very typical to the type of development interest transferred pursuant to the purchase and sale 
agreement. Tr Vol. 2, p. 288, LL 1-12. 
The Berry Note was a promissory note owed to JV, LLC and at the time of closing the 
remaining balance was approximately $2,565,000. Tr Vol. 2, p. 285, LL 4-24. The existing R.E. 
Loans notes was approximately 8.5 million. Trial Exhibit 3; Trial Exhibit AAA. 
One of the members of NIR was Pend Oreille Limited, one of several limited partners 
forming NIR. Tr Vol. 2, p. 285, L. 12-p. 286, L. 7. Pend Oreille Limited contributed the Trestle 
Creek property to NIR as its contribution to become a member ofNIR. Tr Vol. 3, p. 309, L. 17 -
p. 310, L. 4; p. 360, L. 11 - p. 361, L. 1. To complete performance of the sale agreement, NIR had 
Pend Oreille, Limited deed Trestle Creek to POBD.2 Trial Exhibit 11; Tr Vol. 2, p. 285, L. 12 - p. 
286, L. 7. 
A Memorandum of Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement was recorded on June 19, 
2006. Trial Exhibit DDD; Tr Vol. 2, p. 169, LL 19-23. The reason for recording the memorandum 
2 The trial court found VP owned Trestle Creek and executed the deed to POBD for Trestle Creek. R Vol. VII, p. 
1719. This finding was wrong. See Trial Exhibit 11. 
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was to provide notice of the payment terms of the purchase and sale agreement. Tr Vol. II, p. 140, 
LL 6-9. This notice was intended to lead interested parties to Villelli in his role of managing 
member ofNIR for further inquiry. Tr Vol. II, p. 141, LL 6-15. 
After the execution of the third amended and restated purchase and sale agreement, POBD 
sought to increase the R.E. Loans loan amount. For that financing, POBD requested that NIR sign 
a subordination agreement which subordinated its vendor's lien to R.E. Loans' mortgage. Tr Vol. 
2,p.291,L. 19-p.292,L.22. 
Around the same time, POBD drafted a partial termination and requested that NIR execute 
it to release lots which members of PBI had purchased prior to the purchase and sale agreement 
with MDG. Tr Vol. 2 p. 296, L. 3 - p. 297, L. 18. Reeves maintained the inclusion of these 
previously owned lots in the memorandum of contract was inequitable because they were sold 
before negotiation of the purchase and sale agreement. Id. NIR agreed and executed the partial 
release. Tr Vol. 2, p. 297, LL 7-14. The partial termination was recorded on March 15, 2007, 
immediately prior to NIR's agreement subordinating to R.E. Loans. See Trial Exhibits 4 and 6. 
The recording number on the partial termination was 724831. Trial Exhibit 6. The recording 
number on the subordination agreement was 724832, also recorded March 15, 2007. Id. 
When Villelli, as the representative of NIR's managing member, executed the partial 
termination, it contained one Exhibit A with a four-line legal description of seven lots lying within 
the Golden T and Golden T Estates First Addition subdivisions. Tr Vol. 2, p. 297, L. 19 - p. 298, 
L 3; Trial Exhibit 4. A second Exhibit A was included in the recorded copy of NIR' s partial 
termination agreement which matched the legal description found in the NIR subordination 
agreement. Exhibit EEE; Tr Vol. II, p. 298, LL 4-16. No one had an explanation of how this 
recording error occurred. 
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On March 11, 2009, the partial termination was re-recorded by Sandpoint Title with only 
the original Exhibit A (the one with the four-line property description of seven lots that were part 
of the Golden T and Golden T Estates First Addition subdivision as originally executed by Villelli.) 
Trial Exhibit 5. The reason reflected on the face of the document for its re-recording was to correct 
the legal description of the partial termination. Trial Exhibit 5. 
After POBD's purchase of Trestle Creek it needed additional capitalization to continue 
development of Trestle Creek and the surrounding property. Tr Vol. 2, p. 123, L. 17 - p. 124, L. 
3. POBD negotiated a loan with Pacific Capital to provide sufficient capitalization until it could 
obtain other funding. Tr Vol. 2, p. 152, LL 1-14. In connection with the loan to POBD, Pacific 
Capital prepared a 67 page credit authorization report. Trial Exhibit III. This report was dated 
October 18, 2007. Id., page 1. It identified Chuck Reeves, President of POBD, as the primary 
contact for the loan. At trial, Chuck Reeves had no recall of any conversations with Pacific Capital 
regarding the loan. Tr Vol. 2, p. 149, LL 14-16; p. 149, L. 24- p. 150, L. 1. 
Pacific Capital's credit report indicated there was still seller carry back payments owed to 
NIR when the report was prepared. Exhibit III at pages 1 and 3. The credit report also referred to 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement between NIR and POBD for Trestle Creek, and even 
acknowledged NIR's entitlement to participation payments for the project. Exhibit III at 10. At 
trial, Union Bank's vice president, Tarrilyn Barron, who was not involved in the original loan 
transaction, testified that based on the loan file, the bank knew that NIR was entitled to 
participation payments when it loaned money based on the purchase and sale agreement. Tr Vol. 
2, p. 256, LL 5-17. Pacific Capital had even reviewed POBD's Operating Agreement (Exhibit 
MMM) which referenced POBD's obligation to pay NIR both a down payment and participation 
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payments based on the formula in the purchase and sale agreement. Tr Vol. 2, p. 257, L. 6 - p. 
258, L. 18. 
After expiration of the term of Facility #1, Pacific Capital's handling of Facility #2 was 
riddled with inconsistencies and contrary to its own credit authorization. First, Facility #1 was 
effective October 29, 2007 for 90 days. Trial Exhibit NNN; Tr Vol. 2, p. 170, LL 117-20. Facility 
#1 expired January 29, 2008. Trial Exhibit NNN; Tr Vol. 2, p. 173, LL 20-23. Contrary to the 
credit authorization terms, Facility #1 was not timely converted to a promissory note secured by a 
first mortgage in Trestle Creek as required by the credit authorization. The mortgage was recorded 
March 25, 2008, months after the expiration of Facility #1. Trial Exhibit 1; Tr Vol. 2, p. 167, LL 
21-22. 
Also contrary to the credit authorization was the failure to secure a first position mortgage 
on Trestle Creek at the time of conversion of Facility# 1 to Facility #2. A title policy was obtained 
March 25, 2008. Trial Exhibit 8. The Schedule B exceptions in the policy included the JV 
mortgage. Id at exception 26. It also included an exception for an R. E. Loans mortgage dated 
March 6, 2007. Id at exception 28. At the time ofrecording the Pacific Capital mortgage, Pacific 
Capital was behind these mortgages. 
Nearly five months later, POBD approached JV to negotiate a subordination to the Pacific 
Capital mortgage. Tr Vol. 2, p. 168, L. 20 -p. 169, L. 2; p. 178, LL 1-15. A subordination was 
obtained from JV and filed August 6, 2008. Trial Exhibit K; Trial Exhibit 9, at exception 24. The 
same is true regarding the R.E. Loans mortgage. A subordination was filed August 6, 2008. Id. 
at exception 27. 
At the time of trial the development of Trestle Creek has generated approximately $73 
million in revenue to POBD,just $7 million short of the $80 million threshold required before NIR 
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became entitled under the participation formula to further payment of the purchase price. Tr Vol. 
III, p. 364, LL 19-23. At trial, Reeves testified the development was on hold due to a poor real 
estate market and POBD's need for capitalization. Tr Vol. 2, p. 120, L. 23 - p. 121, L. 10. 
However, performance remained due under the purchase and sale agreement. 
III. ISSUES PRESETED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err by holding as a matter oflaw that North Idaho Resorts had 
no vendor's lien against the Trestle Creek property? 
2. Did the district court err by finding that North Idaho Resorts had been paid all sums 
due under the purchase and sale agreement? 
3. Did the district court err in finding that Pacific Capital was a bona fide lender? 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law, but will not 
set aside a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 
302 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2013). This Court also exercises free review over the district court's 
interpretation of statute. Benzv. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215,223,268 P.3d 1167, 1175 (2012). 
That review "must begin with the literal words of the statute, those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Id (internal 
citations omitted). 
B. NIR HAD A VALID VENDOR'S LIEN AGAINST THE TRESTLE CREEK 
PROPERTY 
Following trial, the district court concluded that NIR had no valid vendor's lien at the time 
of trial on the Trestle Creek property. R Vol. VIII, p. 1783. The district court arrived at this 
conclusion for two reasons. First, it interpreted LC. section 45-801 as requiring the seller ofreal 
property to also be the record owner of the property. Since title to Trestle Creek was not recorded 
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in the name of NIR, the court held as a matter of law that NIR could not hold a vendor's lien. 
Second, the trial court found that even ifNIR had a valid vendor's lien, it had received full payment 
under the purchase and sale agreement at the time of trial. R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. 
1. The district court erred bv holding as a matter oflaw that North Idaho 
Resorts never had a vendor's lien because it was not a seller of the 
property 
Idaho statute has codified a vendor's lien as a lien created in favor of a seller of real 
property for which total payment has not been received: 
One who sells real property has a vendor's lien thereon, independent of possession, 
for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured otherwise than by the 
personal obligation of the buyer. 
LC. § 45-801. A vendor's lien is a first priority lien except against a good faith purchaser or 
encumbrancer for value: 
The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one 
claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and 
for value. 
LC. § 45-803. The lien arises by operation oflaw and requires no recording. 
Trial testimony revealed the owner of record on the Trestle Creek property was Pend 
Oreille, Limited. Tr Vol. 2, p. 309, LL 17-25; Exhibit 11. Pend Oreille, Limited is one of several 
limited partners that formed North Idaho Resorts, LLC. Tr Vol. 2, p. 285, LL 12 - p. 286, LL 2. 
Pend Oreille Limited contributed Trestle Creek to NIR in 1998 or 1999. Tr Vol. 3, p. 360, LL 11 
- p. 361, L. 1. 
At trial it was undisputed that Pend Oreille, Limited contributed Trestle Creek to NIR to 
become a member of NIR. It was undisputed there was more than one member in the limited 
liability company. It was also undisputed that NIR sold Trestle Creek to PBI and the sales 
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agreement represented that NIR had the right to make such a sale. The purchase and sale 
agreement entered between NIR and POBD defined NIR as the "Seller": 
This Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale 
Agreement ("this Agreement") .. .is entered into and made effective as of 
March 9, 2006 (the "Agreement Date") by and between [POBD] or such 
affiliate of [POBD] as [POBD] shall designate (in either case "Buyer") and 
NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
("Seller"). 
Trial Exhibit EEE, 1 ( emphasis added). 
No one disputed that NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek. The district court even found 
that NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek: "The seller was North Idaho Resorts, LLC (NIR)." R Vol. 
VIII, p. 1719. Despite this holding, the trial court held as a matter of law that NIR was not the 
seller because the recorded title was not held in NIR's name, but remained in the name of the 
contributing member, Pend Oreille, Limited. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 30-6-401, if a limited liability company has more than one 
member upon formation, those persons become members as agreed by the persons before the 
formation of the company. LC. § 30-6-402(2). Regarding contributions to the limited liability 
company by members, Idaho Code section 30-6-402 provides "[a] contribution may consist of 
tangible or intangible or other benefit to a limited liability company, including money, services 
performed, promissory notes, other agreements to contribute money or property, and contracts for 
services to be performed." Based on this statute, Pend Oreille, Limited could contribute its real 
property interest in Trestle Creek to NIR to become a member of the limited liability company. 
Further, Idaho Code section 55-601 provides that a conveyance of an estate in real property 
may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of it. However, it 
does not require a writing for a conveyance to occur. Despite these statutes, the district court held 
as a matter of law that NIR had to be the record owner in order to sell the property to PBI, holding, 
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The transfer of Trestle Creek to POBD was not executed by "NIR", but one of the 
limited partners that formed NIR. Trestle Creek was never deeded to NIR. As such 
NIR did not obtain a vendor's lien upon Trestle Creek. 
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. In other words, the trial court held as a matter of law, to acquire a vendor's 
lien that the seller must first be the record owner. 
The district court's holding transmuted the statutory language found in Idaho Code section 
45-801 from "one who sells property" to a "record owner who sells property." The district court 
erred when it failed to give the words found in Idaho Code section 45-801 their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning. 
The starting point of interpreting a statute is to give its words their "plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Benz, 152 Idaho at 223,268 P.3d 
at 117 5. "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the 
law as written." Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 649, 214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009) (quoting 
McLean v. Maverick Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). "The 
objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the 
act." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009). Statutory 
interpretation "begins with the literal language of the statute" and "provisions should not be read 
in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document." Id. Words should be 
given their 'plain, usual, and ordinary meanings' and only if the language is 'ambiguous' may this 
court 'consider rules of statutory construction."' Hayes v. City of Plummer, No. 42125, 2015 WL 
5721600, at *2 (Idaho Sept. 30, 2015). 
Title 45, Chapter 8 of the Idaho Code does not define "one who sells," "seller," or "owner." 
A seller is defined as: "[g]enerally, a person who sells anything." Black's Law Dictionary 1482 
(Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009. The definition of owner is narrower: "One who has 
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the right to possess, use, and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests are 
vested." Black's Law Dictionary 1214 (Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). NIR would fit 
within either of these definitions based upon the undisputed evidence before the trial court and 
Idaho statute. 
The district court's interpretation went a step further than the actual language of the statute 
and required that the vendor of the real property first have the property title recorded in its name. 
The definition of a record owner differs from the definition of a seller, or even an owner: "A 
property owner in whose name the title appears in public records." Black's Law Dictionary 1215 
(Bryan A. Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). ). Idaho statues recognize that owner interests may be 
recorded. See LC.§§ 55-606, 55-801, 55-811. A definition of record owner is contained at LC. 
section 63-201(24) (defining a record owner as person(s) whose name appear in the records of the 
county recorder's office). 
Even though Idaho has a statutory scheme for becoming a record owner, LC.§ 45-801 does 
not create a vendor's lien only for a record owner. It creates a vendor's lien in "one who sells real 
property." The plain and ordinary meaning of the statute does not require the vendor of real 
property to be the record owner to claim a valid vendor's lien. Construing Title 45, Chapter 8 
together as a whole, the legislature did not intend that only record owners of real property could 
qualify for a vendor's lien. The district court erred as a matter of law when it held the seller also 
had to have title recorded in its name. As the seller of real property not fully paid, NIR has a valid 
and enforceable vendor's lien on the Trestle Creek property. 
2. The district court erred by finding NIR had been paid all sums due 
under the terms of the purchase and sale agreement 
NIR sold the Trestle Creek property to POBD pursuant to the Third Amended and Restated 
Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Purchase and Sale Agreement"), Trial Exhibits 3 
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and AAA. It was undisputed the purchase and sale agreement set forth the purchase price in Clause 
2. Although a portion of the purchase price was based upon a formula tied to future lot sales, it 
was undisputed that this formula was not a profit sharing arrangement. It was undisputed that the 
participation portion of the purchase price was based upon a formula. It was undisputed such a 
sales term is not uncommon in the sale of land development properties. It was undisputed at the 
time of trial that POBD still held property purchased pursuant to the purchase and sale agreement 
even though lot sales were affected by the poor real estate market and POBD's failure to acquire 
capitalization funding. 
The district court recognized the formula defining the purchase price was a term of the 
purchase and sale agreement. R Vol. VIII, p. 1 719. At trial Reeves testified that the participation 
payments were part of the purchase price as defined by the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Tr Vol. 
II, p. 184, LL 21-24; p. 185, LL 1-5. Villelli's testimony corroborated Reeves' testimony. Despite 
the agreement in Reeves' and Villelli's testimony that the formula in the purchase and sale 
agreement was part of the purchase price, the trial court held "NIR has received all the monies 
guaranteed to it based upon the acquisition of Trestle Creek by POBD." R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. 
This holding was unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. 
First, NIR's payments were related to the entire project sold to PBI. There was no 
segregation of payment for Trestle Creek separate and apart from payment on the entire purchase. 
Regarding the Court's holding on receipt of guaranteed funds, the trial court was partially correct. 
There were certain funds payable to NIR at closing and following closing which were not 
contingent on future events. Other purchase terms were contingent upon future events. Reeves 
testified no participation payments were due yet. Tr Vol. II, p. 120, LL 10-12. NIR's testimony 
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was the same. However, there was no testimony there was a failure of the condition precedent to 
payment of the participation p01iion of the purchase price. 
Whether participations payments were due at the time of trial was not the proper focus. At 
trial, Reeves acknowledged the participation payments as part of the purchase price: 
Q. Would you tum to the next page of that agreement [purchase and sale 
agreement]. There are several other items that were required as part of the purchase 
price. Could you explain to the Court what else you were promising to do under 
this purchase agreement? 
Q. And then there's, I think, one more section of what you've promise as far as the 
purchase price, what was that? 
A. We promised to pay, once we reached $80 million in sales, 20 percent of our 
gross revenue after that point." 
Tr Vol. II, p. 118, LL 21-25; p. 120, LL 10-15. 
The district court appeared to struggle with the fact that at the time of trial there were no 
participation payments yet due. 
NIR has received all of the benefit of its deal with POBD except a share of future 
bulk sales or its share ofrevenues in excess of $80,000,000.00 ... The possibility of 
future bulk sales or revenues is unknown and open to speculation. NIR may or may 
not be due additional monies from POBD in the future, but NIR had received all of 
the monies guaranteed to it based upon the acquisition of Trestle Creek, by POBD. 
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. The Court concluded, "[t]herefore, ifNIRhas a vendor's lien it has no value." 
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. The Court's analysis is unsupported by statute or law. The mere fact that a 
contract relies upon future events to trigger further performance does not invalidate the contract or 
the terms. POBD's and NIR's testimony demonstrate a meeting of the minds regarding the 
payment of the purchase price, including the participation formula related to future sales. 
That POBD's further payment of a purchase price relied upon a condition precedent which 
might fail did not invalidate the purchase price term. Our Court of Appeals has recognized a 
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condition precedent as a valid contract term in World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 
880, 887-888, 728 P.2d 769, 776-777 (Ct.App. 1986), holding: 
A condition precedent is an event not certain to occur, but which must occur, 
before performance under a contract becomes due. Ross v. Harding, 64 Wash.2d 
231, 391 P.2d 526 (1964); RESTATEMENT§ 224. A condition precedent may be 
expressed in the parties' agreement, implied in fact from the conduct of the parties, 
or implied in law (constructive) where the courts "construct" a condition for the 
purpose of attaining a just result. Ross v. Harding, supra; 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS §§ 631-32 (1960) (hereinafter referred to as CORBIN); 
RESTATEMENT § 226 comment c; compare Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. 
Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974) (recognizing express, 
implied-in-fact, and implied-in-law contracts). When there is a failure of a 
condition precedent through no fault of the parties, no liability or duty to perform 
arises under the contract. Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 451 P.2d 529 (1969). 
See also 3A CORBIN§ 628; RESTATEMENT§ 225. A condition precedent is 
distinguishable from a promise or covenant in that a condition creates no right or 
duty of performance in itself and its non-occurrence does not constitute a breach of 
the contract. "A promise in a contract creates a legal duty in the promisor and a 
right in the promisee; the fact or event constituting a condition creates no right or 
duty and is merely a limiting or modifying factor." 3A CORBIN§ 633. A covenant 
is a duty under the contract, the breach of which gives a right to enforce the contract. 
Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., l 02 Idaho 852, 642 P .2d 943 (1982). See also 
3A CORBIN§ 633; 17 AM.JUR.2d Contracts§ 320 (1964). 
This Court adopted the World Wide Lease, Inc. holding in Steiner v. Ziegler-Tamura Ltd., 138 
Idaho 238, 242, 61 P.3d 595, 599 (2002). Further, if a contract contains a condition precedent to 
a party's performance obligation and the occurrence of the condition is within the control of that 
party, the party must make a good faith effort to bring about that condition. Johnson v. Lambros, 
143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that contracts based upon conditions precedent 
are enforceable. In Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), this Court upheld an 
attorney contingent fee agreement as valid even though no fee would be owed unless the attorney 
recovered on the claim. That the attorney may recover nothing has never been applied to render a 
contingent fee contract invalid in Idaho. In Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941, 
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946, 821 P.2d 996, 1001 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court of Appeals examined the damages due for 
breach of a contract with a payment term based upon a formula similar to the present case. The 
parties agreed the Plaintiff would receive payments of a certain amount of future sales of cases of 
beer. The contract was not determined to be invalid because it was based upon a formula and 
contingent upon future sales. 
NIR' s entitlement to participation payments for future sales of the property sold to POBI 
(including Trestle Creek) was a right to payment with an undetermined value. Even though the 
real estate market was sluggish at the time of trial, there was no evidence there was a failure of the 
condition precedent. Although the trial comi could not apply the formula to arrive at an exact 
amount NIR would be due under the participation formula, it does not invalidate NIR's vendor's 
lien. The issue before the district court, and now before this Court, is whether NIR has a vendor's 
lien, not what value the lien had during trial. Since there was no failure of the condition precedent 
in the contract, the vendor's lien remained valid. 
The only way that NIR would not receive further payments from the development is if 
there were no property remaining that could be sold in the future. Richard Villelli, whom the 
district court specifically found was a credible witness, testified that in his 4 7 years of real estate 
development he has observed that despite market fluctuations and low points, as long as you 
"adapt, and as long as you're in a position that is relatively secure you can adapt and make sure 
those projects move forward and are profitable." Tr Vol. III, p. 364, LL 1-7; p. 357, LL 12-8; R 
Vol. VIII, p. 1721. The trial testimony established the development had generated approximately 
$73 million in revenue to POBD, leaving only approximately $7 million more until NIR could 
receive participation payments. Tr Vol. III, p. 364, LL 19-23. The trial court erred in holding that 
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the vendor's lien was eliminated because the amount that would come due was not established 
with mathematical precision. 
C. PACIFIC CAPITAL WAS NOT A BONA FIDE LENDER 
The district court heard testimony regarding NIR' s recordation of a memorandum of its 
purchase and sale agreement and a subsequent partial termination of that memorandum recorded 
with an incorrect legal description attached. Two legal descriptions were attached, one for seven 
lots, and one which described all the property sold by NIR to PBI. The trial court concluded that 
Pacific Capital did not have constructive knowledge ofNIR's vendor's lien based on this partial 
termination, and therefore it was a bona fide lender. 
When Pacific Capital made its Facility #1 loan to POBD, which was after the partial 
termination was recorded, it had actual knowledge that NIR was still owed money on the sale to 
PBI. Because of this actual knowledge, Pacific Capital did not qualify as a good faith 
encumbrancer for value and NIR's vendor's lien was superior in priority to Pacific Capital's 
mortgage. 
Idaho statute places a vendor's lien at the highest priority possible, except as to good faith 
encumbrancers for value. I.C. § 45-803. Good faith in that section means "lack of actual or 
constructive knowledge of the applicable lien." Benz, l 52 Idaho at 228, 268 P.3d at 1180. Any 
knowledge of another's claim in real property negates good faith. Fouser v. Paige, l 01 Idaho 294, 
298,612 P.2d 137, 141 (1980). 
Despite the ample evidence presented at trial that Pacific Capital had actual knowledge of 
NIR's claim to a vendor's lien, the district court erroneously found that Pacific Capital had no 
constructive knowledge from the recorded documents given the partial termination, and therefore, 
the Pacific Capital mortgage was superior: "There is no evidence that UB had notice of any 
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mistakes in the recorded record of title to Trestle Creek when UB made its loan and/or security 
agreement with POBD." R Vol. VIII, p. 1722. In concluding this, the district court focused upon 
Pacific Capital's knowledge regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the recording of 
the incorrect partial termination of the memorandum of purchase and sale agreement. The trial 
court held "[t]here is no evidence that UB [Pacific Capital] had notice of any mistakes in the 
recorded record of title to Trestle Creek when UB [Pacific Capital] made its loan and/or security 
agreement with POBD." R Vol. VIII, p. 1722. 
The focus of the trial court should not have limited Pacific Capital's constructive notice 
from the record. The district comi erred when it limited its focus to whether Pacific Capital knew 
the partial termination of NIR's interest in the purchase and sale agreement contained an error in 
the attached legal description. 
The district court's inquiry in determining if Pacific Capital was a bona fide lender at the 
time should have included whether it had actual knowledge that POBD owed NIR money at the 
time of making its loan to POBD. The undisputed evidence, which came from Pacific Capital's 
own loan file, and which was not contradicted at trial, was Pacific Capital had actual knowledge 
after the partial termination was recorded that NIR had a vendor's lien. 
The trial court failed to address Trial Exhibit III, Pacific Capital's credit authorization 
report, which showed that Pacific Capital had actual knowledge ofNIR's claim to a vendor's lien 
for the sale of Trestle Creek. The credit authorization report was replete with references to money 
owed to NIR by POBD on the sale, had references to the Purchase and Sale Agreement between 
NIR and POBD, including its payment terms, NIR's entitlement to participation payments, and the 
status of the project including its completed sales. For instance, on its first page under the section 
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"Summary Purpose" the report indicated that the seller from the 2006 sale (NIR) was still owed 
money from that sale: 
To provide operating line that will assist borrower with working capital and 
marketing expense for Phase 1 of proposed development known as "The Idaho Club 
Lake & Golf Retreat" in Sandpoint, Idaho. Portion of the proceeds will payoff a 
$2,000M private seller carry back note originating from the purchase of the subject 
property in June 2006. (See Sources & Uses on Page 3) 
Trial Exhibit III, page 1. The same amount owing NIR was also referenced in the Sources and 
Uses section of the credit authorization report. Trial Exhibit III, page 3. This language showed 
actual knowledge by Pacific Capital when it made its loan to POBD. Further, the Sales History 
section at page 10 of Exhibit III referenced the Purchase and Sale Agreement and NIR's 
entitlement to participation payments: 
The larger Idaho Club development was purchased in 2006 with a large down 
payment. Borrower's down payment for the subject payment totaled approximately 
$16,000M consisting of cash and carry back financing. Of the $16,000M, the 
overall equity contribution from principals was approximately $10,000M. The 
Purchase and Sale Agreement includes deed releases at preset prices for the 
different components within the larger 900 plus acre development. The seller also 
has the right to receive additional payments for sales in excess of preset prices 
on the different components when completed. The projected overall sale price 
when complete is expected to be in the $86,000M to $96,000M price range. 
Trial Exhibit III, 10 ( emphasis added). Terrilyn Baron, vice president of Union Bank at the time 
of trial testified that based on her review of Exhibit III, Pacific Capital knew about the purchase 
and sale agreement terms and POBD' s obligation to make participation payments to NIR: 
Q. So, the bank was aware that the purchase and sale agreement had a 
continuing ongoing obligation and that there was such an agreement, right, at the 
time that it made facility one? 
A. Based on this information we knew there was a purchase and sale 
agreement, the bank, yes. 
Q. And you knew there was a continuing obligation to pay on lot sales at 
preset prices, right? 
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A. Yes, based on this. 
Tr Vol. II, p. 256, LI. 5-17. Additionally, Pacific Capital had reviewed POBD's Operating 
Agreement (Trial Exhibit MMM) that referenced POBD's obligation to pay NIR a down payment 
and participation payments. Tr Vol. II, p. 257, L. 6 -p. 258, L. 18. 
In the liabilities portion of the credit authorization report, it was noted that notes payable 
in the Pend Oreille (Trestle Creek) project were 9.1 OOM from RE Loans Inc. and 3.070M in seller 
carry and assumed financing. Trial Exhibit III, page 33. 
The evidence introduced at trial through Exhibit III, the credit authorization report, and the 
testimony of Terrilyn Baron established that Pacific Capital had actual knowledge after the partial 
termination was recorded that NIR was still owed money from the real property sale. 
The trial court ignored Pacific Capital's actual knowledge of the debt in its opinion, holding 
that "UB [Pacific Capital] was not a party to the partial termination agreement, and is entitled to 
rely upon the recorded title to Trestle Creek as it existed in 2008 when UB made its loan to POBD." 
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. While NIR does not disagree with this statement, the trial court could not 
ignore Pacific Capital's actual knowledge of the vendor's lien. 
The district court misapplied the terms of Idaho Code section 45-805 to the case. The 
district court's failure to address Pacific Capital's actual knowledge was error. The trial court's 
finding that Pacific Capital was a bona fide lender is not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
NIR asks the Court to reverse the district court's ruling that NIR did not have a right to a 
vendor's lien. NIR requests the Court reverse the district comi' s ruling that NIR' s vendor lien was 
paid in full. NIR further asks the Court reverse the district court's ruling that Pacific Bank was a 
bona fide lender because it had no knowledge ofNIR's vendor's lien. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of October, 2015. 
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